Queensland court of appeal opines on the meaning of 'material prejudice' by Dixon, Bill
This is the author’s version of a work that was submitted/accepted for pub-
lication in the following source:
Dixon, WilliamM. (2011) Queensland Court of Appeal opines on the mean-
ing of ’material prejudice’. The Queensland Lawyer, 31(1), pp. 5-8.
This file was downloaded from: http://eprints.qut.edu.au/42455/
c© Copyright 2011 Lawbook Company/Thomson Legal & Regulatory
Notice: Changes introduced as a result of publishing processes such as
copy-editing and formatting may not be reflected in this document. For a
definitive version of this work, please refer to the published source:
Queensland Court of Appeal Opines on the Meaning of “Material Prejudice” 
 
The decision of Wilson J in Wilson v Mirvac Queensland Pty Ltd1 was the subject of an article in an 
earlier edition of this journal.2  At that time, it was foreshadowed that the decision was to be taken on 
appeal.  The decision of the Court of Appeal in Mirvac Queensland Pty Ltd v Wilson3 is considered in 
this article. 
 
At First Instance 
 
The decision of Wilson J in Wilson v Mirvac Queensland Pty Ltd4 involved the interpretation of the 
term “material prejudice” for the purpose of s 214 of the Body Corporate and Community 
Management Act 1997 (Qld). 
 
Section 213 of the Body Corporate and Community Management Act 1997 (Qld) obliges the seller of 
a proposed lot to provide the buyer with a disclosure statement before the contract is entered into.  
Where the seller subsequently becomes aware that information contained in the disclosure statement 
was inaccurate when the contract was entered into or the disclosure statement would not be accurate 
if now given as a disclosure statement, the seller must, within 14 days, give the buyer a further 
statement rectifying the inaccuracies in the disclosure statement.5 
 
Provided the contract has not been settled, where a further statement varies the disclosure statement 
to such a degree that the buyer would be materially prejudiced if compelled to complete the contract, 
s 214(4) of the Body Corporate and Community Management Act 1997 (Qld) provides that the buyer 
may cancel the contract by written notice given to the seller within 14 days, or a longer period as 
agreed between the parties, after the seller gives the buyer the further statement. 
 
Mrs Wilson was the purchaser of a proposed residential lot in stage 2 of Mirvac’s Tennyson Reach 
development.  After stage 1 of the development had been completed, Mirvac provided Mrs Wilson 
with a further statement pursuant to s 214 of the Body Corporate and Community Management Act 
1997 (Qld) explaining how certain inaccuracies in the first statement would be rectified together with a 
substitute disclosure statement incorporating the changes.  While the documentation included some 
proposed assets of the body corporate there was no reference to the certain security equipment. 
 
Within the available 14 day statutory period, Mrs Wilson purported to cancel the contract on the basis 
that she would be materially prejudiced if compelled to complete.  In this regard, Mrs Wilson advised 
that security was a very important consideration for her husband and herself, given their personal 
circumstances (Mrs Wilson’s husband being a Federal Magistrate who was commonly involved with 
family law matters), and the proximity of the building to the State Tennis Centre and proposed public 
parklands.  To a lesser extent, Mrs Wilson also considered that the absence of artworks, decorative 
items and a BBQ and tables and chairs detracted from the amenity of the development.  Finally, Mrs 
Wilson considered that the provision of lift curtains were necessary to prevent damage occurring 
when items were being moved in or out of the building, and to minimise the expense that would be 
incurred by the body corporate if that were to occur. 
 
Over two weeks later (and outside the 14 day statutory period available for cancellation purposes), 
Mirvac’s solicitors advised that, by oversight, some of the assets which had already been provided by 
Mirvac upon completion of stage one had not been listed when the further statement was provided.  A 
further statement was enclosed confirming Mirvac’s original undertaking to provide all of the assets 
listed in the original disclosure statement including the security equipment and other assets listed 
above. 
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Wilson J noted that the test for determining whether a buyer would be materially prejudiced if 
compelled to complete a contract within the meaning of s 214(4)(b) had not been authoritatively 
determined previously.6  Wilson J considered the following matters to be clear: 
(a) The test is objective having regard to the particular buyer’s circumstances: would someone in 
the buyer’s circumstances be materially prejudiced? 
(b) Material prejudice must be assessed in light of the buyer’s circumstances when the further 
statement is received or at the very latest 14 days from receipt; 
(c) A causal relationship is needed between the inaccuracy and the prejudice; 
(d) There is a need for proportionality between the inaccuracy and the prejudice; and 
(e) As part of consumer protection legislation, the term should be construed beneficially.7 
Applying these principles, Wilson J held that Mrs Wilson had validly cancelled the contract on the 
premise8 that the body corporate would not have a security system that had been promoted as an 
integral feature of the development where security was a very important consideration for Mrs Wilson. 
 
On Appeal 
 
The Queensland Court of Appeal (McMurdo P, Fraser JA and Jones J) dismissed Mirvac’s appeal. 
 
In upholding the decision of Wilson J,  
 
 
Comment 
 
As noted by McMurdo P, while this result may appear harsh to sellers it is consistent with one of the 
objects of the legislation namely to provide an appropriate level of consumer protection for putative 
buyers of lots included in community titles schemes.  Consistent with the level of consumer protection 
intended, both the original disclosure statement and any further statement are prescribed by statute to 
have contractual effect allowing a putative buyer to rely upon the information in both as being 
warranted to be accurate by the seller 
 
 
 
Bill Dixon 
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